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CHAPTER 2 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§2.1. Execution of wills: Attestation. It has been stated that at-
testing witnesses to a will must bear witness to those things which the 
statute requires for a writing to be a valid wilJ.1 It is clear, however, 
that a will may be validly executed even though it is signed by the 
testator out of the presence of the witnesses. If the instrument is 
signed by the maker, who later acknowledges his signature to the wit-
nesses, such acknowledgment is held to be the equivalent of a signing 
in their presence. When the maker signs the writing not in the pres-
ence of the witnesses but later acknowledges the instrument to be his 
will, there mayor may not be a valid attestation. 
In Nunn v. Ehlert 2 it was held that a declaration by the testator 
that a writing was his will did not make for a proper execution when 
he concealed his previously affixed signature from the witnesses. This 
was not an acknowledgment of a signature but of the fact that the 
writing was signed. From the facts of the case it was apparent that 
the concealment was intentional. 
In Tredick v. Bryant 3 the testator folded the will prior .. to its being 
subscribed by witnesses. His signature, because of the fold, could not 
be seen. The will was under the control of each witness while he or 
she signed, and no witness was told not to look at it or was prevented 
from looking at it or its contents. The Supreme Judicial Court con-
cluded that the will was not legally executed because the case could not 
be distinguished in principle from Nunn v. Ehlert. 
In the 1956 SURVEY year the case of Dunham, Petitioner,4 which is 
quite similar to the Bryant case, came before the Supreme Judicial 
Court. The testator requested two persons to witness a will previously 
signed by him. His signature was visible and seen by both of them 
when they subscribed. Later on, he requested a third person to witness 
the instrument he said was his will. When this witness signed, the 
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§2.1. 1 Nunn v. Ehlert, 218 Mass. 471, 474, 106 N.E. 163, 165 (1914). 
2218 Mass. 471, 106 N.E. 163 (1914). 
3269 Mass. 50, 168 N.E. 162 (1929). 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 747, 134 N.E.2d 915. 
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paper was so folded that the testator's signature was not visible. In his 
report of the material facts the probate judge recited that the third 
witness did not see the testator's signature and was not restrained or 
prevented from lifting the paper to see it. 
The Court found the will to be validly executed, pointing out that 
the signature was not actively hidden or concealed from the third wit-
ness. It said: "The failure of a witness to see the testator's signature 
which is written on the face of the instrument which the testator de-
clares to the witness is his will, due to the fact that the signature of 
the testator is unintentionally withdrawn from the view of the witness 
by a fold in the instrument, does not render void the execution of the 
instrument as a will." 5 
This case would seem to overrule Tredick v. Bryant on the facts 
except for the Court's statement: "We infer from the findings of the 
judge that the instrument was handed to [the third witness] for his 
signature and that he put the instrument in the position in which it 
was when he signed." 6 In the Bryant case it was the testator who 
folded the will. In view of the material facts reported by the lower 
court it is difficult to see how this was a necessary inference to be drawn. 
However, it would seem that since the other witnesses had seen the 
testator's signature, there was no attempt to conceal the signature in-
tentionally when the third witness subscribed the folded will. If the 
maker's signature had been visible but not seen when the witness 
signed, the execution would have been valid.7 It would be an ex-
tremely fine distinction to draw if we were to treat differently the situa-
tion where, due to the physical position of a folded paper, the signa-
ture is not visible but can be seen by the slight act of straightening out 
the paper. 
§2.2. Proof of will. It is common knowledge among probate prac-
titioners that an uncontested will may be allowed on the testimony of 
only one attesting witness. Indeed, if all the heirs assent in writing, 
a will may be probated without any testimony whatsoever. However, 
in the case of a contest all witnesses to the will must testify if available, 
and if any are dead or out of the jurisdiction, secondary evidence of 
execution and attestation may be introduced. 
In Goodwin v. Riordan,! an instrument purporting to be a will was 
written and signed by one who was apparently in the navy. Imme-
diately below his signature appeared the signatures of three persons 
together with their service designations. In the probate proceeding 
one of the witnesses testified that the signature was his but that he 
had no memory of the time, place, or circumstances attending the 
signing. It appeared that another witness was dead and the third wit-
ness was living in Georgia. The attorney for the proponent decided 
51956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 749, 134 N.E.2d at 916. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Barber v. Henderson, 304 Mass. 3,22 N.E.2d, 620 (1939). 
§2.2. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. llll, 130 N.E.2d 569. 
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to proceed without the testimony of the absent witness. The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the denial of probate of the instrument on the 
ground that the proponent failed to sustain the burden of proving 
proper execution. 
The Court remarked that a presumption of execution according to 
the requirements of the wills statute would arise on proof of all sig-
natures despite failing memories of witnesses; and this would be so 
even though there were no attestation clause. These signatures could 
be proved to be genuine by handwriting comparison, and the Court 
pointed out that it might have been possible to authenticate the sig-
natures of the unavailable witnesses by comparing them with signatures 
of enlisted men that the United States Government might have. 
If there were no available evidence of genuineness of the signatures 
it might be that there would be a presumption of regularity of execu-
tion arising from the appearance of the signatures on the instrument.2 
If there were such a presumption, it would be negatived in this case 
by the proponent's failure to call the out-of-state witness or to use 
other avenues of proof. 
To permit a presumption of due execution to arise solely from the 
appearance of the signatures on a purported will, and despite avail-
ability of proof of their authenticity, would seem to conflict with the 
policy of our statute of wills which requires not only the signing by 
the testator but also the attestation and subscription by at least three 
competent witnesses. 
§2.3. Old age assistance: Liability of estate. Before 1941, Massa-
chusetts cities and towns could not recover for old age assistance upon 
any implied contract theory.! In the absence of mistake, accident, or 
fraud, the only possible way that the town could be reimbursed for 
payments to the aged was by an action on a bond which had to be 
filed with the board of public welfare in certain instances.2 
General Laws, c. 1I8A, §4A, authorized recovery of old age assistance 
payments in an action of contract if the recipient or his estate is in 
possession of funds not otherwise exempt (i.e., real estate the assessed 
value of which exceeds $3000).3 The case of Dartmouth v. Paull 4 
held that when funds are exempt in the hands of the recipient of 
assistance, on his death, the funds pass to his estate retaining the quality 
of exempt property. The town could not recover the amount expended 
for old age assistance in an action against the executor. 
In Town of Dennis v. Cook5 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded 
2 The Court cited Scarff v. Scarff, [1927] Ir. R. 13. Where witnesses to a will could 
not be located, the Irish court held that there was a presumption of regularity of 
execution if a reasonable search for the witnesses proved fruitless. 
§2.3. 1 Worcester v. Quinn, 304 Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463 (1939). 
2 Acts of 1936, c. 436, §§4, 5. 
8 G.L., c. ll8A was further amended by Acts of 1951, c. 801, §4, providing for a 
lien on real estate. 
4329 Mass. 22, 105 N.E.2d 846 (1952). 
51956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 753, 135 N.E.2d 537. 
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that where real estate assessed under $3000 was sold by the adminis-
trator pursuant to c.L., c. 202, §l, for a sum in excess of the asssessed 
valuation, the proceeds of the sale retained its status of exempt prop-
erty and so passed to the intestate's heirs. The Court stated that 
though the funds are "assets in the hands of the executor or admin-
istrator in like manner as if they had originally been part of the per-
sonal property of the deceased," 6 and are subject to the payment of 
debts, that fact does not make such proceeds the equivalent of non-
exempt funds which can cause the claim for aid furnished, otherwise 
unenforceable, to become enforceable. The Court remarked that the 
rule of the Paull case is not affected by the sale of real estate for an 
amount above the exemption figure. 
A more complicated problem arose in Town of Shrewsbury v. 
Murphy.7 Anna Daley died intestate in May, 1951, leaving an estate 
consisting of two parcels of real estate. Anna's sister and sole heir, 
Ellen, died in October, 1951, and in December of that year the de-
fendant was appointed administrator of both estates. Acting as ad-
ministrator of Anna's estate, the defendant sold the real estate by 
license of the Probate Court. The assessed valuation of the property 
was under $3000, but the proceeds of the sale, even after payment of 
debts, were in excess of the statutory exemption. In an action brought 
by the town under C.L., c. lISA, §4A to recover for assistance fur-
nished to Ellen, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld a judgment for 
the administrator on the ground that the action was prematurely 
brought. The defendant retained the funds as administrator of the 
estate of Anna and had not yet passed over the funds to himself in his 
capacity as administrator for the estate of Ellen. The Court, however, 
went on to observe that the town would have a good claim in case 
suitable proceedings were brought after the proceeds of the sale came 
into the hands of the defendant as administrator of the estate of Ellen. 
Of course, realty descends directly to the heir at law without any 
intervention on the part of the decedent's personal representative. If 
there were no sale by Anna's administrator, the Paull case would pre-
clude recovery by the town in an action of contract. If the sale were 
made by Ellen's administrator, the Cook case would control and the 
proceeds in excess of the statutory exemption would retain the exempt 
status of the land. But the sale here was by the defendant acting as 
administrator of Anna who was not the beneficiary of the town's 
assistance. 
The Supreme Judicial Court resolved the problem as one involving 
the construction of C.L., c. 202, §19, which authorized the sale by 
Anna's administrator and which provides: 
. . . the net proceeds of such sale, after deducting the expenses 
thereof and such amount as may be required for the payment of 
debts ... and charges of administration, in consequence of a de-
6 G.L., c. 202, §l. 
71955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1083, 130 N.E.2d 559. 
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ficiency in the personal property, shall be paid over to the person 
or persons who would have been entitled to such real estate and in 
the proportions to which they would have been entitled had it not 
been sold. 
It was noted that if Ellen had lived she would have been entitled 
to the proceeds of the sale of the real estate in the administration of 
Anna's estate, and such funds would not have been exempt under the 
old age assistance statutes. Since Ellen died before the sale, the pro-
ceeds of the sale became available to her administrator in her stead as 
nonexempt funds. The statute's reference to the "person . . . who 
would have been entitled to such real estate" necessarily means the 
person identified as such as of the time of decedent's (Anna's) death. 
The proceeds of the sale when paid to the personal representative of 
the recipient of the old age assistance would come into his hands as 
new assets of the estate in the right of his intestate and would be funds 
"not otherwise exempted" under C.L., c. lISA, §4A. 
§2.4. Savings bank trusts: Proof. Because of the ambiguous nature 
of the transaction whenever a savings account is opened in the name 
of the depositor in trust for another, there has been a mass of litiga-
tion involving these arrangements. Among the various motivations 
for them may have been the desire of the depositor to avoid bank 
rules as to limits on accounts, statutory limits, maximum coverage by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the desire to create a 
trust for the benefit of another. 
Because of the informal nature of the usual transaction, the Massa-
chusetts law has so crystallized as to require not only an intent to 
create a trust but also notice of the account to the intended beneficiary 
before a valid trust will come into existence.1 
In 1956 the Supreme Judicial Court held in the case of Berger v. 
Berger2 that it was error for a master to ,exclude evidence to the effect 
that a subscription to bank shares in trust for another was made after 
the subscriber purchased shares in her own name and was told by the 
bank clerk that she had already subscribed to the limit allowed by law 
but that she could open an account as trustee for another. The ex-
cluded evidence tended to show that the intent necessary for the crea-
tion of a trust was lacking. 
The same case decided that the subscriber could testify as to her own 
intention to impose any enforceable duties on herself with respect to 
the account and as to her intent to make any gift. Proof of intent to 
create a trust being necessary for the creation of a trust, the subscriber 
may testify as to this material fact to be proved, and it should make 
no difference that such testimony is self-serving.3 
§2.4. 1 O'Hara v. O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1935); Greeley v. Flynn, 310 
Mass. 23, 36 N.E.2d 394 (1941); Day Trust Co. v. Malden Savings Bank, 328 Mass. 
576, 105 N.E.2d 363 (1952). But compare Cohen v. Newton Savings Bank, 320 Mass. 
90, 101 N.E.2d 872 (1946). 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 159, 132 N.E.2d 179. 
3 Powell v. Powell, 260 Mass. 505, 157 N.E. 639 (1927). 
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§2.5. Revocable trusts: Testamentary disposition. In Ascher v. 
Cohen l a married woman desired to put her property beyond her hus-
band's reach without any present knowledge on the part of her husband 
and children as to what she was doing. She conveyed stock of a closely 
held corporation in trust to herself, and another as co-trustees. She 
reserved the power to alter, amend, and revoke the trust. The trust 
instrument provided that the trustees were to pay her the net income 
and so much of the principal as she might request. There were con-
tingent remainders over to her children. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a decree of the lower court 
dismissing a petition brought by her husband after her death to re-
cover the stock as assets of his wife's probate estate. The Court found 
the arrangement to be non testamentary and one which deprived the 
husband of any interest in the stock. 
It seems to be settled Massachusetts law that if a settlor actually 
divests himself of legal title in his lifetime, but reserves such powers 
as to give him full practical control over the trust assets during his life-
time, the disposition is inter vivos. The question to be answered is 
whether the transfer is in good faith or merely illusory. 
In National Shawmut Bank v. Joy2 the Court pointed out that de-
spite the several powers reserved to the donor the trustee still had 
active duties to perform and remarked: "We need not decide whether 
the trust would have been valid had the trustee been reduced to passive 
impotence, or something near it." 3 In the Joy case it appeared that 
the trustee had at least the duty to collect and pay over income to the 
trustor and the discretion to make distributions of principal to him 
during his life. In the Ascher case the trustees had the duty to pay 
the entire income to the settlor during her life, but she alone had the 
power to consume principal. It should not make any difference that 
she was also a co-trustee.4 In Greeley v. Flynn,5 involving a revocable 
voluntary declaration of trust of a savings account, the Court did not 
seem greatly concerned with the fact that the trustee was "reduced to 
passive impotence." In the light of the Flynn case, it appears that a 
disposition is inter vivos if there is an intent to create an equitable 
interest in another during the lifetime of the settlor notwithstanding 
the reservation of full powers to divest and control the disposition 
during the donor's lifetime and despite the lack of active duties of 
management on the part of the trustee. 
Since the trust in the Ascher case involved a formal execution of a 
trust instrument and a transfer of the res to trustees, no notice was 
required for the creation of beneficial interests in the cestuis.6 Nor 
is it of any legal significance that the trustor's motive may have been 
§2.5. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. I, 131 N.E.2d 198. 
2315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944). 
3315 Mass. at 476, 53 N.E.2d at 125. 
4 Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E.2d 238 (1950). 
5310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E.2d 394 (1941). 
6 Aronian v. Asadoorian, 315 Mass. 274, 52 N .E.2d 397 (1943). 
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to deprive her husband of any intestate or statutory forced share.7 
Her spouse was effectively deprived of the property when it was kept 
out of her probate estate by the inter vivos transfer. 
§2.6. Construction: Gaps in dispositive provisions. Experienced 
draftsmen of wills and trusts know that it takes many hours of hard 
work and much imagination to draft dispositive provisions for an estate 
plan so as to take care of all foreseeable contingencies. The failure to 
provide expressly for the events that actually happen after a plan goes 
into operation makes for the great bulk of construction problems that 
call for court litigation. This 1956 SURVEY year had the usual share of 
suits involving interpretation of instruments involving gaps in dis-
positive clauses. 
In Balcom v. Balcom l the testator's will, written by a layman, gave 
his entire estate to his wife and then recited that the failure to provide 
for his children was intentional. Then followed the final clause: 
"Should death occur to us both at the same time, what then remains 
is to be divided equally between our two children, Frances Sheridan 
Balcom and Warren Sheridan." The testator's wife died about three 
months after the execution of the will, more than a year before he died. 
In addition to Frances and Warren named in the will the testator left 
a third child, a daughter by a former marriage, who sought a dis-
tributive share of her father's estate through intestacy. 
A majority of the Court gave the estate to Frances and Warren to 
the exclusion of the third child. It construed the simultaneous death 
clause relating to the deaths of testator and his wife to mean that the 
two children named in the will were to take if the wife died first. 
Emphasis was placed on the previous clause intentionally omitting 
the children and the general presumption against intestacy. The 
majority declared: 
The significant words in the clause under consideration are 
"occur" and "at the same time." The time to which reference is 
made necessarily means the time when the testator shall die. Bya 
transposition of words and a change of time the clause will read, 
"Should at the same time death have occurred to us both." It will 
then plainly express the meaning which we attribute to the 
testator.2 
Although the courts should be reluctant to imply gifts and trans-
pose clauses in order to arrive at a symmetrical and plausible estate 
plan for a testator, it does not appear that the majority exceeded the 
proper bounds of interpretation. The testator expressed a preference 
for the two children named in his will and it seems unlikely that he 
meant the gift to them to take effect only on the very remote con-
7 Charest v. St. Onge, 332 Mass. 628, 127 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 
317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945). 
§2.6. 1 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 231, 132 N.E.2d 305. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233, 132 N.E.2d at 307. 
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tingency that he and his wife should die at the same time. This ap-
parent general desire to benefit them alone should prevail over what 
seems to be an inconsistent clause expressly designed to cover the un-
usual case.3 The dispositive provisions were simple in structure and 
inartistically drafted by a non-lawyer. 
The Court also looked at the general dispositive scheme set out in 
a will to imply a further limitation in the case of Fay v. Fay.4 There 
the testator left the residue of his estate in trust to be divided into as 
many parts as there were children of his living at the time of his death 
or who had died before him leaving issue living at his death. He di-
rected the trustees to hold these shares for the lives of such children 
and issue and twenty years thereafter, paying the income to the chil-
dren and to the issue per stirpes. On the death of each beneficiary 
his portion of the income was to be paid to his lawful issue as he might 
appoint by will and in default of appointment to the issue equally. 
The will then provided that if any beneficiary died without leaving 
issue surviving him, his share of income was to be divided among his 
brothers and sisters as he might designate by will and in default of 
appointment to his brothers and sisters equally or to the issue of a 
deceased brother or sister by right of representation. If there were no 
brothers or sisters or issue of deceased brothers or sisters, then the in-
come was to be divided among the beneficiary's aunts and uncles and 
their issue by right of representation. There was a provision to the 
effect that if any of the testator's sons or their male issue should not 
have a definite occupation their share of the income was to be limited. 
All of testator's children survived him. One son, Joseph, died leav-
ing no issue and exercised his power to appoint income equally in 
favor of his other two brothers, Prescott and Rodman, excluding his 
sister. Rodman then died leaving issue, expressly stating in his will 
that he did not wish to exercise his power of appointment. It was held 
that Rodman's original share of income and the share which Joseph 
appointed to him merged to be disposed of on his death in the same 
manner as the one-fourth share he originally received. 
The Court, realizing there was a gap in the dispositive scheme ex-
pressed in the will, thought it was the desire of the testator to keep 
income distributions in the direct line of his descendants until the 
direct line was exhausted. His primary, though not clearly expressed, 
purpose was to provide for his issue only during the maximum period 
permitted by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
In Flaherty v. Gray5 the Court filled in a glaring gap in a trust 
created by four Boston newspapers to provide retirement benefits for 
their employees. Each company was to contribute to the fund, and the 
employees, upon becoming eligible for retirement, were to receive 
designated sums monthly. The trust indenture had no provision set-
ting out the duties of the trustees in case any of the newspaper com-
3 Compare Frost v. Courtis, 167 Mass. 251, 45 N.E. 687 (1897). 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 135 N.E.2d 306. 
51956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 134 N.E.2d 144. 
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panies defaulted in making contributions. One of the newspapers 
defaulted and the Supreme Judicial Court decided that the trustees 
had no power to make payments to the otherwise eligible employees 
of the company in default. 
It was found that the underlying purpose of the creators of the trust 
was to create a sound funded pension plan. The parties to the plan 
realized that if they did not all contribute the agreed amounts to the 
trust and if the retirement payments were made when due, the plan 
would not be actuarially sound and in time would collapse. 
§2.7. Construction: Redundancy. Although sparsity of language 
and extreme generality make for the usual problems of interpretation, 
occasionally redundancy and cumbersomeness of structure in disposi-
tive schemes lead to litigation. Such a situation appeared before the 
Court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Kennard.1 There the testatrix made 
four bequests of $10,000 to certain persons and gave $3000 to another. 
It was then provided that if the total of these pecuniary legacies ex-
ceeded one half of the total amount of the cash and securities in her 
estate on the date set for distribution, the $3000 legacy was to be paid 
in full and the $10,000 legacies were to abate proportionately to the 
extent necessary to keep the total of the pecuniary bequests within a 
sum not exceeding one half the value of the cash and securities. In 
the fifteenth paragraph of her will she gave two charities "one half 
of the cash and securities. at market value remaining in the hands 
of my executor at the date set by it for distribution of my estate." 
The residue of the estate was left equally to the four persons desig-
nated to take the $10,000 legacies. 
In a petition for instructions on the question whether the pecuniary 
legacies should be paid before the charities should receive one half of 
the cash and securities, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Pro-
bate Court's ruling that they should not. 
It was argued by the residuary legatees that such a construction 
would make the four $10,000 legacies to them redundant, but the 
Court responded by saying: 
Such cumbersomeness of structure as is here manifested does not 
of itself require that the will be construed so as to remove it. The 
principle that construction shall be such as to make all parts of the 
instrument operative does not require that a will be construed to 
avoid redundancy. This is not a case where an absolute gift will 
be defeated by giving effect to a later equivocal expression of a 
contrary tendency.2 
The fifteenth paragraph was found to be unambiguous. What re-
mained in the hands of the executor at the date set by it for dis-
tribution necessarily included the amounts required to pay the pe-
cuniary legacies. The word "remaining" did not require a reference 
to the preceding dispositions in the will. It meant what was left after 
§2.7. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 363, 132 N.E.2d 738. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 365, 366, 132 N.E.2d at 740. 
9
Slizewski: Chapter 2: Trusts and Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1956
§2.8 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 27 
payment of funeral expenses, administration expenses, and claims 
against the estate. 
Although the word "remain" is one which usually appears in a 
residuary clause, and as such has reference to what is left for distribu-
tion among the residuary beneficiaries after all prior gifts have been 
satisfied, the word did not appear in the residuary bequest in this will. 
The bequest of one half of the cash and securities to the charities 
would seem to be either a specific or general legacy. The residuary 
clause followed this gift. 
§2.8. Duty of trustee: Self-dealing; Measure of liability. Before 
1935 it was a breach of trustee's duty for a Massachusetts trust com-
pany to deposit trust funds in its commercial department pending 
their distribution to the beneficiaries.1 In that year the General Court 
enacted G.L., c. 172, §54, which permitted a trust department to de-
posit trust funds in the commercial department of the same company 
provided that specified security was first transferred to the trust de-
partment. However, with the decision of New England Trust Co. 
v. Triggs2 it appears that a trust company which exercises its statutory 
privilege to hold trust property in its own commercial department will 
find itself accepting increased responsibilities which it might not other-
wise have. 
In this case the corporate fiduciary sold securities of a certain trust 
and deposited the proceeds in its own commercial department to await 
distribution to the beneficiaries. Since there were certain legal ques-
tions pending, the money remained in this department for two and 
one-half years earning no interest. The Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed the probate judge's finding that the failure to invest the money 
for so long a period was a willful breach of trust, but went on to hold 
the corporate trustee liable. It found that reasonable prudence would 
have required the trustee to put the cash to work at a time when it 
was established beyond doubt that there would be a delay of at least 
six months in the distribution of the trust fund. The trust company 
was held liable "to account for the profits which resulted from such 
withholding, or alternatively for the fair value of the use of the money, 
after the date when the money should have been invested ... " 3 
The Court said that apart from the effect of the fiduciary's deposit 
in its own commercial department, the trustee would not have been 
surcharged because of the presence of an exculpatory clause in the trust 
instrument. But this clause, which provided, "Each of my trustees 
... shall be liable for his own receipts, payments and wilful defaults 
and for nothing else ... nor for errors in judgment," was held in-
sufficient to excuse the trustee from accounting for profits which 
accrued to it. The reference to "receipts" seemed to the Court to be 
capable of such a construction as to require an accounting, and the 
strong policy against gain by a trustee at the expense of the trust 
§2.8. 1 Morrison v. Lawrence Trust Co., 283 Mass. 236, 186 N.E. 54 (1933). 
:I 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 135 N.E.2d 541. 
31956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 785, 135 N.E.2d at 551. 
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should militate against an interpretation which would permit profits 
to be retained.4 
There was no evidence that any profit actually accrued to the trustee, 
but the Court equated profit with the opportunity for profitable use: 
What the trustee had, which belonged to the trust, was the op-
portunity for the profitable use of the fund. We think it would 
be contrary to public policy to allow the trustees to enjoy this with 
an obligation to pay compensation left solely dependent upon an 
outcome profitable to the trustee. What the trustee would have 
had to pay for the like use of a like amount from other sources is 
a measure of the advantage to the trustee. This is "in hand" in 
the sense that it would otherwise have been paid out and is sub-
stantively in this respect like a receipt from or profit on the trust 
fund ... I} 
Once it is admitted that there is a breach of trust and the breach 
results in the failure to make a gain which otherwise would have been 
available to the beneficiaries, the trustee may be held liable for the 
profit which would have been realized.6 It should make no difference 
that there was neither actual loss nor gain to the trust. In the Triggs 
case, however, because of the exculpatory clause it was necessary for 
the Court to find a profit or "receipts" before the clause could be made 
inoperative. The Court seemed to go somewhat beyond the decided 
cases in treating the opportunity for profit as the equivalent of profit.7 
Admitting an unexcused breach of trust, it seems entirely proper 
for a court to give the cestuis the alternative remedies of holding the 
trustee accountable either for any profits from the failure to invest 
or for the gain that would have arisen had the investments been made 
when they should have been. Since the failure to invest funds within 
a reasonable time by itself would not make the trustee liable in the 
Triggs case in view of the exculpatory clause, the Court had to limit 
the remedy available to the beneficiaries to accountability for profit 
or its equivalent accruing to the trustee. Having control of trust 
funds which might be used by the trust company for investment profit-
able to itself gave the fiduciary a financial advantage which was thought 
to have monetary value. 
§2.9. Finality of decrees allowing accounts. In the years prior to 
the enactment of G.L., c. 206, §24,1 the finality of a decree allowing a 
trustee's interim account depended upon the question whether the 
petition was for the allowance or for the determination and adjudica-
4 I Restatement of Trusts §222(2). 
51956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 786, 135 N.E.2d at 551. 
62 Scott on Trusts §205 (2d ed. 1956). 
7 The Court cited McIntire v. Mower, 204 Mass. 233, 90 N.E. 567 (1910). There 
the executor occupied one of the houses in the estate and was charged with the 
value of the occupancy. It would seem that he actually received a material benefit 
measured by the fair rental value. 
§2.9. 1 Inserted by the Acts of 1938, c. 154. 
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tion of the account.2 This statute was designed to do away with this 
tenuous distinction and make all decrees on applications for allow-
ance of accounts unimpeachable, except for fraud and manifest error, 
provided the proper notice was given to all interested parties.3 
Questions involving the scope of and the finality of decrees allowing 
interim accounts came up for consideration in Old Colony Trust Co. 
v. Mabbett. 4 In a petition for the allowance of the trustee's tenth to 
thirteenth accounts, objection was raised by a guardian ad litem to 
the twelfth and thirteenth accounts. Accounts one through five were 
determined and adjudicated in 1935, and in 1939 the sixth to ninth 
accounts were allowed under the 1938 statute. 
The first account reported the purchase of bonds of three different 
railroads and the twelfth and thirteenth accounts reported the sale 
of these bonds at considerable losses. The judge of the Probate Court 
charged the trustee with the loss resulting from the sale of the securities 
of one railroad on the ground that, when they were purchased, the 
chairman of the board of directors of the corporate fiduciary was also 
a director of the railroad company. He ruled that, since this fact of 
interlocking directorship was unknown at the time the prior accounts 
were allowed, there was no prior adjudication. 
With regard to the bonds of the other two railroads he found that 
the trust company made use of "Moody's Bond Ratings"; that at the 
time of purchase they had an "A" rating with Moody; that the rating 
was changed to "Ba" by Moody in the early 1930's. The judge then 
ruled that ordinary prudence would require the trustee to sell the 
obligations within thirty days after they received the Ba rating and 
charged the fiduciary with so much of the loss as equaled the dif-
ference between the sale price and the amount they would have 
brought had they been sold thirty days after the Ba rating. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court, holding that 
the judge wrongfully passed on items which were previously adjudi-
cated when he surcharged the trustee for the losses shown in the 
twelfth and thirteenth accounts. The decrees of allowance of the first 
nine accounts precluded inquiry into the propriety of the purchase 
of the bonds and their intention during the period covered by these 
accounts. The Court found no evidence of fraud or manifest error 
and pointed out that it was not improper for the trustees to carry 
these bonds in the accounts at book value despite substantially lower 
market value. 
Although it might be objected that entering investments at book or 
inventory value in many successive interim accounts may be misleading 
to beneficiaries who very often are unfamiliar with the technicalities 
of accounting and the problems of investments, the Court recognized 
that this was the widespread practice among fiduciaries. Apparently, 
2 Greene v. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 295 Mass. 148, 3 N.E.2d 254 
(1936). 
3 Newhall, Settlement of Estates 167-169 (1949 Supp.). 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 931, 135 N.E.2d 914. 
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it is up to the cestuis to examine the accounts and make any objections 
at the hearing where they may also require the trustee to testify as to 
the actual value of the investments.5 
The Court did not discuss the issue of dual capacity involving the 
purchase of bonds of the railroad where the fiduciary's chairman of 
the board was also a director but merely recited that the purchase of 
such bonds was not fraud. The facts appear to fall short of the type 
of self-dealing which is objectionable for a fiduciary. It appeared that 
the bonds were purchased on open market at the prevailing price, and 
the amount bought was in no way a significant part of the total ob-
ligations issued by the railroad. Whatever relationship existed be-
tween the railroad and the trustee because of the interlocking 
directorship was exteremely insignificant and indirect. It would 
be hard to find that the trustee was under a real temptation to con-
sider its own advantage to the detriment of the beneficiaries.6 
§2.10. New legislation. Chapter 316 of the Acts of 1956 increases 
from $10,000 to $25,000 the minimum distributive share of a surviving 
spouse in the estate of an intestate decedent who leaves no issue. It 
leaves the share that the surviving spouse is entitled to by electing to 
take against the will as it was under the old law (e.g., the first $10,000 
outright), and is made applicable to decedents dying after January I, 
1957. 
Chapter 187 requires the registers to give notices of decrees and 
orders of Probate Courts to the attorneys of record or to any party who 
has appeared personally and given his address. This act makes man-
datory what most registers were accustomed to do as a matter of 
courtesy. 
Chapter 317 extends the statute setting up an informal probate pro-
ceeding for small estates to the estates of persons who were receiving 
relief, support, or assistance at death. 
General Laws, c. 262, §40, which was amended in 1955, when the 
filing fees were increased, was further amended by Acts of 1956, c. 632. 
It is now provided that the fee for the petition for allowance of an 
account is $5 for each year where the gross value in schedule A is 
$10,000 or more; where the gross value is more than $1000 and less 
than $10,000, $5 per year, but the fee shall not exceed $10: where the 
gross value is $1000 or less, no fee. 
In 1954 the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that, if an intestate 
distributive share were sent to a distributee residing in a country 
under Communist control, such share would be largely confiscated, 
and the Court required the foreign resident to appear personally in 
court to claim his share.1 Chapter 257 of the Acts of 1956 provides 
for a way to benefit such a foreign legatee or distributee by sending 
him necessaries of life. It reads: 
I> Greene v. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 295 Mass. 148, 154, 3 N.E.2d 
254, 257 (1936); G.L., c. 206, §3. 
6 See 1 Restatement of Trusts §170. 
§2.l0. 1 Petition of Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E.2d 854 (1954). 
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Whenever payment of a legacy or distributive share is to be made 
to a person who is domiciled in a country or state outside of the 
United States or its territories, in which the court, in its discre-
tion, finds that there is not a reasonable assurance that such 
legatee or distributee will actually receive payment of his legacy or 
distributive share in substantially full value, the court, upon peti-
tion of the executor, administrator, or an interested party, or in 
its discretion, may order that such legacy or distributive share be 
paid, in whole or in part, to said executor, administrator, or in· 
terested party for use by him in the purchase of goods in the form 
of necessaries of life, food, clothing and medicines, to be sent to 
such legatee or distributee through a recognized public or private 
agency, upon his written request, order, or assignment. 
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